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Abstract  
By investigating the influence of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on bank margins and 
profitability, this paper identifies country- and bank- specific characteristics that amplify or 
weaken the effect of NIRP on bank performance. Using a dataset comprising 7,359 banks from 
33 OECD member countries over 2012-2016 and a difference-in-differences methodology, we 
find that bank margins and profits fell in NIRP-adopter countries compared to countries that 
did not adopt the policy. Moreover, this adverse NIRP effect depends on bank specific-
characteristics such as size, funding structure, business models, assets repricing and product – 
line specialization. The effectiveness of the pass-through mechanism of NIRP can also be 
affected by the characteristics of a country’s banking system, namely, the level of competition 
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Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), policy-makers have been facing a challenging 
economic situation dominated by economic stagnation, high unemployment and deflation. As 
an immediate monetary policy response, central banks cut interest rates aggressively through 
conventional accommodative monetary policies. However, when interest rates approached the 
zero lower bound (ZLB) without producing the hoped-for effects on nominal spending and 
inflation, many central banks implemented a range of unconventional monetary policies 
(UMPs) including large scale asset purchase (LSAPs) in the form of quantitative easing, as 
well as policy rate forward guidance. UMP took a step further from 2012 onwards when several 
countries/regions (Denmark, the Euro Area, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Japan) implemented negative interest rates policy (NIRP) in order to provide further economic 
stimulus to constantly weak economies (the time of introduction of NIRP is noted in Table 1).  
 
The aim of NIRP is to increase the cost to banks of holding excess reserves at the central bank 
encouraging them to take them back on the balance sheet (Coeuré, 2016). This should lead to 
beneficial outcomes for the real economy coming mostly from a greater supply and demand 
for loans due to the decline in funding costs for both banks and borrowers. Nevertheless, going 
beyond the barrier determined by the ZLB and pushing rates into “uncharted” negative territory 
deserves serious consideration and analyses. In this regard, the “how low for how long” 
question has raised concern about the long-term effect of this policy on financial 
intermediaries’ performance and on the economy as a whole (McAndrews, 2015).  
 
Since interest rates affect both the asset and the liability sides of banks’ balance sheet, the effect 
of NIRP on banks performance is ambiguous (Riksbank, 2016). A cut in interest rates into 
negative territory may increase bank profitability if: a) there is significant loan growth and 
margins are not reduced, b) banks boost fee and commission income, c) they hold a sizeable 
amount of fixed-income securities, d) banks also reduce non-interest expenses, or/and e) 
negative interest rates improve borrowers’ creditworthiness reducing loan-loss provisions. On 
the other hand, if banks are unable to reduce deposit rates to the same extent as loan rates then 
margins will be compressed, and if there are limited opportunities to boost non-interest income 
then profits will likely fall. This will depend also on bank-specific characteristics (size, funding 
structure, business model, assets repricing and product-line specialisation) as well as the 
characteristics of a country’s banking sector (degree of competition, prevalence of fixed 
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/floating lending rate)). Banks that rely on wholesale funding may benefit from NIRP in terms 
of cheaper funding costs compared to those that depend mainly on retail deposits where rates 
are ‘sticky’ downward. Similarly, banks with a business model focused on non-interest income 
(so-called more services oriented) may be less affected by NIRP than banks focusing mostly 
on traditional intermediation activities. Large banks that have greater international reach, 
potential to increase lending abroad and more diversified portfolios are better equipped to 
hedge against interest rate risk and to switch to non-interest focused business models when 
margins are squeezed. Finally, banks with specific product-line specialisation (such as 
mortgage lenders) are more likely to be strongly affected by NIRP. Country features such as 
the degree of banking sector competition, the prevalence of fixed/floating lending rate, as well 
as a country’s current account surplus may also play an important role. Higher bank 
competition level and fixed lending rate can amplify the contraction of NIMs, and banks 
operating in countries with sufficient surpluses are likely to hold larger excess reserves subject 
to NIRP. 
 
The aforementioned factors are essential for the evaluation of NIRP by policy-makers as the 
pass-through effect of NIRP on bank performance can have profound policy implications in 
terms of both monetary transmission and financial stability. If NIRP results in a decline in 
profits, this can erode bank capital bases through a reduction in retained earnings. In turn, this 
can further limit credit growth stifling NIRP monetary transmission. Low profitability may also 
raise financial instability concerns especially as many European banks have been struggling to 
maintain (respectable) levels of profitability because of the slow economic recovery, 
historically high levels of non-performing loans, and a post GFC and European sovereign debt 
crisis deleveraging phase. Banks and depositors ‘move-into-cash’ behaviour could also affect 
monetary policy transmission and financial stability. If banks hoard cash, this would undermine 
the effect of NIRP and, consequently, weaken the transmission mechanism. On the other hand, 
the risk of deposit flight will endanger financial stability by boosting liquidity risk in the 
banking sector.   
 
We contribute to the existing literature, which typically focuses on low and/or more ‘normal’ 
interest rate environments, by investigating, firstly, the impact of NIRP on net interest margins 
(NIMs) and bank profitability and, secondly, how bank- and country-specific characteristics 
can amplify or weaken the pass-through effect of NIRP on banks performance. Based on the 
Euro Area Bank Lending Survey of April of 2016, NIRP hurts bank profitability. Eighty 
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percent of banks in the survey stated that they expected NIRP to have a negative influence on 
margins and profits. The result provides further motivation for our investigation into the effects 
of NIRP on bank performance.  
 
To investigate the impact of NIRP on bank margins and profits we employ a bank-level 
database comprising 7,352 banks in 33 OECD countries over the period 2012-2016 and a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology. The DiD methodology enables us to draw 
conclusions on whether NIRP has squeezed banks’ NIMs and profitability in NIRP adopter 
countries after the implementation of negative rates. Moreover, it permits us to analyse the 
effectiveness of the pass-through mechanism of NIRP under different macroeconomic and 
bank-specific environments. Our results show that NIM and return-on-assets (ROAs) 
demonstrate a strong contraction after NIRP implementation in the treated group, with, on 
average, a reduction of 12.64% for NIM and 6.29% for ROA. This finding holds well even 
when we combine DiD with propensity score matching (PSM). Our results also highlight that 
NIM contraction reduces banks’ profitability, despite the case that lower rates can boost bank 
profits through valuation gains on fixed-income securities (direct) and a reduced cost of non-
performing loans (indirect). Finally, the negative effect on profits and margins appears to have 
been stronger for banks that: are small; have ‘interest-oriented’ business models; are real estate 
and mortgage specialists; are well capitalised; lend within national borders; weakly hedge 
against interest rate risk; operate in competitive systems and where floating loan rates 
predominate.  
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 reviews the relevant academic literature. Section 3 
introduces our data and methodology. Section 4 presents our results along with several 
robustness checks and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Tests 
 
Our study is based on the literature that analyses the effects of interest rates on bank 
performance. While there is an extensive literature on the determinants of bank margins and 
profits that follow the pioneering work of Ho and Saunders (1981), the literature evaluating 




One of the first empirical paper dates back to the early 1980s, in which the switch from low to 
high interest rates determined by the “Volcker doctrine” raised concerns about the soundness 
and stability of commercial banks and saving and loans associations (“thrift” institutions) that 
“borrow short and lend long”.2 In this context, Flannery (1981) finds that, while drastic interest 
rate changes can threaten banking system stability, large U.S. banks mitigate these risks by 
modifying assets and liabilities positions in order to have matched maturities. Hancock (1985) 
notes that if monetary policy does not affect the spread between interest earning assets and 
liabilities, an increase in interest rates tends to boost bank profits. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) were among the first to investigate the effect of real interest rates on bank margins and 
profitability. Using cross-country and bank-specific data on margins, they find that high real 
interest rates are associated with higher NIMs and profitability, especially in emerging 
economies. English (2002), studying the link between interest rate risk exposure and bank 
margins in ten OECD countries over the period 1979-1999, points out that the average yield 
on bank assets is more closely related to long-term rates than the average yield on liabilities, 
hence a steep yield curve should be associated with higher NIMs. In a similar framework, 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) also use information from ten OECD countries over 1981-
2003 and aggregate income statement data to show that short-term and long-term rates have a 
differential influence on bank margins with a more sizeable effect in the long-run. The relation 
between the slope of the yield curve and bank profitability has been evidenced also by 
Alessandri and Nelson (2015) with reference to the UK banking sector. Again, their findings 
suggest that over the long-run (measured using ten-year government bond yields) higher 
interest rates have an unambiguous positive effect on bank profitability and margins. Busch 
and Memmel (2017), studying the German market during ‘normal’ and low interest rate 
periods, find a small but positive effect of long-term rates on bank margins. However, they 
state that, during periods of low interest rates, the ZLB constraint on deposit products puts 
additional stress on banks’ margins. Claessens et al. (2018), investigating 47 countries, confirm 
that low interest rates reduce the ability of banks to be profitable. 
 
Size and business models appear to be key factors that enable banks to hedge against interest 
rate risk avoiding excessive NIMs and profits volatility in ‘normal’ operating environments. In 
this regard, Angbazo (1997) finds that U.S. banks with assets size greater than $1 billion have 
                                                          
2 Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve during the period 1979-1987, is credited with ending the high 
level of inflation in the United States by using tight monetary policies and high interest rates.  
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net interest income that is not sensitive to interest rate volatility, while the opposite is found 
for small regional banks. Product specialisation, assets composition and size are also found to 
be important by Hanweck and Ryu (2005). Using a sample of U.S. banks, they underline how 
small regional banks and mortgage specialists are particularly affected by the volatility of 
interest rates. Genay and Podjasek (2014) indicate that U.S. banks face decreasing NIMs and 
returns during periods of low interest rates – and (again) the effect is particularly strong for 
small institutions. However, they also suggest that the benefits of low rates (in terms of 
boosting economic activity) outweigh the costs. On the other hand, Covas et al. (2015) show 
that, during a period of low interest rates (2010-2015 in their sample), NIMs decline more 
markedly for large U.S. banks (70 basis points against 20 basis points for small banks) because 
small banks benefit more from a fall in deposit costs. 
 
Empirical analysis of the influence of NIRP on bank margins and profits links to the 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) literature. UMP generally includes Quantitative 
Easing (QE) (large-scale asset purchases) and policy guidance (aimed at managing down long-
term interest rate expectations). These policies not only reduce market interest rates but expand 
and modify the size and composition of both central bank and commercial bank’s balance 
sheets with likely impacts on bank margins and profits. In this regard, Lambert and Ueda 
(2014), using a sample of U.S. banks over 2007-2012 report a negative relationship between 
the size of central bank’s balance sheet (used as a proxy indicator of QE) and NIMs. Expanding 
central bank balance sheets alleviate bank funding costs, but the influence is offset by reduced 
revenues from new loans. Similar results have been displayed by Alessandri and Nelson (2015), 
who show that Bank of England balance sheet expansion had a negative influence on bank 
NIMs. 
 
The effect of NIRP is expected to be transmitted via lower money market and bank lending 
rates to households and corporates (Jobst and Lin, 2016). As previously explained, these lower 
rates affect both sides of a bank’s balance sheet. When lower policy rates are transmitted to 
bank loan rates, they reduce the value of bank assets. Conversely, lower policy rates also reduce 
the cost of bank liabilities, namely, lower funding expenses. Heider et al. (2017) find that when 
policy rates remain positive, deposit rates closely track policy rates. However, when policy 
rates turn negative, banks that rely on deposit funding are reluctant to reduce deposit rates 
fearing a loss of their funding base. When downward sticky deposit rates compress lending 
margins, banks tend to shift activities toward fee-based services. Arteta et al. (2016) suggest 
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that lending rates generally decline under NIRP, particularly in countries with greater bank 
competition, but the pass-through effect of NIRP is only partial due to downward rigidities in 
retail deposit rates. 
 
The extant of earlier literature that investigates the effect of NIRP on bank margins and 
profitability is still limited. It generally comprises discussions on the possible effects of NIRP 
on bank performance and overviews of developments in key banking and other financial 
aggregates in the immediate pre- and post- NIRP periods. In this regard, several papers (Bech 
and Malkhozov, 2015; Jobst and Lin, 2016; Gross, 2016; Blot and Hubert, 2016; Brunnermeier 
and Koby, 2016; and IMF, 2017) debate the effect of NIRP on bank profitability without a 
clear consensus emerging.  
 
In this study, we aim to provide further evidence on the relationship between NIRP and bank 
margins and profitability. Moreover, we investigate effectiveness of the pass-through 
mechanism of NIRP under different bank and country – specific features.  
 
2.1 Hypotheses Testing  
 
As aforementioned, earlier literature did not manage to provide a clear conclusion on the 
relationship between NIRP and bank profitability. There are two main reasons why a negative 
interest rate environment differs from that characterised by low interest rates (Arseneau, 2017; 
Eggertsson et al. 2017; Lopez et al. 2018). First, in contrast to a positive interest rate 
environment, NIRP is subject to the imperfect pass-through of deposit rates as banks are 
reluctant to impose negative rates on depositors in fear of losing their deposit base (Jobst and 
Lin, 2016; Demiralp et al. 2017). Second, negative interest rates excessively flatten the yield 
curve lowering expectations of future economic growth. Both of these effects can amplify NIM 
contraction in comparison to a positive rate environment because banks cannot reduce deposit 
rates to the same extent as loan rates and the flattening of the yield curve compresses interest 
income on long-term maturity assets. In this context, we want to investigate whether negative 
rates significantly squeezed bank NIMs and profits in NIRP countries. If negative interest rates 
only have limited pass-through to bank deposit rates (Eggertsson et al. 2017; Lopez et al. 2018) 
and lending rates closely track policy rates, then the compression of long-term maturity assets 
combined with downward rigidities on deposit rates will narrow bank margins under NIRP 
8 
 
(Heider et al. 2017). We investigate this point in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the paper. Our first 
hypothesis test is as follows: 
 
H1: NIRP has a negative impact on bank margins and profits. 
 
The impact of NIRP on bank profitability can vary according to bank and country – specific 
characteristics. Given the heterogeneity of banks and countries in our sample, we test the 
differing effects of NIRP on net interest margins and bank profitability by conducting several 
sub-sample analyses. As suggested by Bernanke (2016), the effect of NIRP on bank 
profitability will depend on the sources of bank funding. Banks that depend on retail deposits 
are more vulnerable as they will find it more difficult to pass negative rates onto depositors. 
Large banks have more diversified portfolios, greater international reach and hedging 
expertise; therefore, they can mitigate the effect of NIRP on bank margins and profits by 
hedging against interest rate risk via derivatives and increasing non-interest income activities 
(Altavilla et al. 2017; Chaudron, 2018). From a business model perspective, banks with 
different product-line specialisation tend to exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity to interest 
rate risk. Hence, banks such as real estate mortgage specialists, that have a higher proportion 
of long-term assets in their portfolio and face stronger maturity mismatch risk, could suffer a 
more considerable contraction in profitability induced by NIRP. This will depend also on the 
contractual details of existing loans and, in particular, their degree of interest rate indexation. 
Banks that hold mostly floating interest rate loans face stronger compression of NIMs (IMF, 
2017). When banks are under-capitalised, the positive effect of NIRP on bank funding cost is 
limited as banks face difficulties in raising capital. This may have a negative effect on banks’ 
profitability if the decrease in loan rates dominates the reduction of bank funding cost. 
However, banks that hold capital in excess of that required by regulation face an opportunity 
cost and profitability pressure as excessive capital could be employed for profitable investment 
opportunities. Finally, competitive behaviour among banks amplifies their exposure to negative 
interest rates. If competition between banks is fierce, lending rates should drop, and if deposit 
rates are already low, then margins will be compressed (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2016). We 
test the effectiveness of the pass-through mechanism of NIRP under different bank and country 
– specific features in section 4.3 of the paper. Our second hypothesis is accordingly as follows:  
 





3. Methodology and Data 
 
 3.1 Methodology  
 
To capture the effect of NIRP on ROAs and NIMs we use a DiD methodology. This 
methodology has been widely used in the policy evaluation literature and more recently to 
banking and financial sector issues (Beck et al., 2010; Calderon and Schaeck., 2013; Berger et 
al., 2014; Fiordelisi et al., 2017). The advantage of this approach is that it allows for a panel 
data set-up, which compares a treated group of banks (those impacted by the policy change) 
with those that are unaffected (the control group or untreated banks). The approach also helps 
to control for ‘omitted variable bias’. For instance, regulatory changes (such as Basel III or the 
launch of the ECBs Single Supervisory Mechanism) may affect treated and untreated bank 
performance alike, regardless of the NIRP introduction. However, as these changes may affect 
banks similarly, the DiD approach avoids this bias by differencing away common trends 
affecting both groups. Our regression model takes the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the NIM (or ROA) of bank i in country j at time t. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if bank 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑗𝑗 has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the period that country 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑇𝑇 decided to 
implement NIRP and 0 before that period, and 𝛽𝛽1 represents the average difference in NIM and 
ROA between countries that switched to NIRP and countries that did not.3 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
bank- and country-specific characteristics to capture cross-bank and cross-country 
heterogeneity over time that can affect NIMs and ROAs. Bank-specific variables are a 
combination of balance sheet and performance measures (see next section for a detailed 
explanation). We also include country specific dummies (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖) to control for time-invariant, 
unobservable characteristics that can shape NIMs and ROAs. We include year fixed effects 
(𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 ) to control for time-variant shocks over the sample period on bank NIMs and ROAs 
                                                          
3 The majority of NIRP countries in our sample introduced NIRP in 2014, hence 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 takes the value 1 from 
2014. However, since Sweden, Norway and Switzerland introduced NIRP in 2015 for these the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 dummy is 
set at 2015. 
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limiting the potential bias in estimates of 𝛽𝛽1. All regressions are estimated with bank-level 
clustering, namely allowing for correlation in the error terms. We use robust standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity and dependence (see Bertrand et al, 2004; Donald and Lang, 
2007; Petersen, 2009). 
 
The inclusion of covariates in a DiD framework presents advantages but also disadvantages 
(Lechner, 2010). On the one hand, introducing explanatory covariates can have the positive 
advantage of detecting cross-bank and cross-country heterogeneity that can potentially affect 
bank NIMs and ROAs independently by the introduction of NIRP. On the other hand, the 
introduction of covariates can cause two main problems. First, when banks are relatively 
homogeneous in both the treatment and control group, additional covariates can weaken, 
instead of strengthen, the likelihood that both groups maintain the parallel trend, hence 
violating our assumption. Second, time varying covariates can change or be influenced by the 
post-treatment period, leading to endogeneity problems. We assess this problem in three ways. 
First, we provide statistical tests of mean differences for bank and country covariates between 
the treated and the control group (Table 1 and Table 2). As displayed, the control variables are, 
on average, in most cases statistically different between the two groups. Second, we test the 
control variables for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). A mean VIF 
of 1.07 suggests that our controls are not highly correlated (a correlation matrix is provided in 
Table A1 in the appendix). Second, to avoid the possibility that time varying control variables 
can be influenced by the intervention (the NIRP introduction), we test the control variables as 
dependent variables in the difference-in-differences specification. The test (not reported) 
suggests that our control variables are not affected by the intervention. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 
Furthermore, the DiD approach requires that several assumptions hold. First, the control group 
must constitute a valid counterfactual for the treatment. In order to address this concern, we 
estimate Pearson correlation coefficients (Table A2 in the Appendix) for three macroeconomic 
variables (GDP growth, Inflation and Unemployment) in the treatment and control groups. The 
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significance of coefficients suggests that the countries in the two groups experienced a similar 
macroeconomic environment confirming the fact that the control group constitutes a valid 
counterfactual scenario for the treatment. Furthermore, as a robustness check, we combine the 
difference-in-differences methodology with propensity score matching (PSM) which, by 
pairing each bank with a control unit, allows us to control for banks having similar 
characteristics.  
Finally, assignment of the treatment has to be exogenous with respect to bank performance. In 
other words, the policy action (‘intervention’) should affect bank performance and not vice 
versa. As pointed out by Couere’ (2016), Riksbank (2016) and IMF (2017) the aim of NIRP is 
“pushing up below-target inflation” or “responding to weak aggregate demand”. Increased cost 
of holding excess reserves at the central bank encourages banks to take them back on the 
balance sheet to improve loan supply. Hence, influencing bank performance (profits and 
margins) is not the policy-makers main target but rather a side effect. Moreover, Figure 1 shows 
that, prior to the introduction of NIRP, NIMs and ROAs moved in a similar direction but the 
relationship changed thereafter. This is confirmed when we examine the requirement of a 
‘parallel trend assumption’. According to Bertrand et al. (2004) and Imbens and Wooldridge 
(2009) the DiD approach is valid only under the restrictive assumption that changes in the 
outcome variable over time would have been exactly the same in both treatment (countries that 
experienced NIRP) and control groups (without NIRP) in the absence of the intervention (the 
introduction of NIRP). Figures 1 depicts the level of NIMs and ROAs from 2011 to 2016 for 
both NIRP adopter and non-adopter countries. Both NIMs and ROAs move in the same 
direction in the pre-treatment period (correlation among the treatment and control group is 0.94 
and 0.58 for NIM and ROA in the pre-NIRP period, respectively), indicating that the parallel 
trend assumption holds. Since June 2014, when policy rates in most of the NIRP adopter 
countries turned negative, NIRP affected banks register lower performance with NIMs falling 
below 2% in 2014-2015 and below 0.40% for ROAs in 2015 (correlation among the treatment 
and control group is -0.87 and -0.94 for NIM and ROA in the post-NIRP period, respectively). 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 




We rely on Jobst and Lin (2016) for dating the adoption of NIRP regimes and construct a 
dataset combining information from several sources. The macroeconomic series are from 
Thomson DataStream, World Bank Databases (World Bank Financial Development Database 
and World Bank Doing Business Database), Bank for International Settlement Database and 
ECB Statistical Warehouse Database. Bank balance sheet and performance data are from Orbis 
Bank Focus and SNL Financial with the aim of maximising the sample size. This also makes 
it possible to check the consistency of the information provided and to minimise misreporting 
and outliers. Since Orbis comprises cross-country banks that operate in more than one country, 
balance sheet data can be either consolidated or unconsolidated. To avoid concerns regarding 
banks that operate in more than one country in both treated and non-treated groups, we use 
bank account data that are either unconsolidated (U1 and U2 codes in Orbis) or consolidated 
but not with an unconsolidated subsidiary. To avoid differences in reporting and accounting 
conventions, both Orbis Bank Focus and SNL Financial provide standardised bank accounting 
information. Orbis Bank Focus gives information on whether a company is active or inactive. 
This allows us to check bank entry and exit status. Accordingly, we drop banks that are or have 
become inactive over the sample period. We remove also those banks with an annual asset 
growth higher than 50% to deal with those in substantial mergers and acquisitions activity. Our 
sample covers 7,352 financial institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative 
banks, bank holding companies, finance companies and real estate mortgage specialists) from 
33 OECD countries over 2012 - 2016. The sample period is intentionally short. According to 
Bertrand et al. (2004) and Roberts and Whited (2013), the change in the treatment group should 
be concentrated around the onset of the treatment. Moving away leads to unobservable and 
other factors that affect the treatment outcome leading to omitted variables bias and 
consequently threatening the validity of our model. The treated countries include those of the 
Euro Area, Hungary, Sweden and Switzerland. Bank balance sheet variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level to avoid the influence of outliers.  
 
Descriptive statistics for bank ROAs and NIMs, other bank balance sheet variables, the 
macroeconomic and institutional variables in the treatment and control groups prior to and after 
the introduction of NIRP are shown in Tables 1 and 2 (a more detailed explanation of the 
variables and expected signs are provided in Table A3 in the appendix). Panels A and C of 
Table 2 display summary statistics of our dependent variables. Following Borio et al. (2015) 
and Claessens et al. (2018), we define bank net interest margins (NIM) as the difference 
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between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the amount of interest 
earning assets. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing bank’s net income by total 
assets. As shown in Table 2, the mean values of bank ROAs and NIMs for the control group 
remain constant in the pre and post – NIRP periods. However, for the treatment group the mean 
values of bank ROAs and NIMs experienced a contraction in the post-NIRP period from 0.47% 
to 0.40% and from 2.06% to 1.92%, respectively.  
 
Bank balance sheet data. Panels B and D of Table 2 present summary statistics of bank 
balance sheet data. Bank size (Size) is measured as the logarithm of bank total assets. 
According to Goddard et al. (2004) and Mirzaei et al. (2013) banks size affects profits 
positively through the realisation of economies of scale. However, as suggested by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) large efficient banks apply lower 
margins to customers through increasing returns to scale. Therefore, we use Size to control for 
the impact of economies of scale on bank NIMs and profits. Large banks, with greater 
international reach, have more potential to increase lending abroad in comparison to small 
banks that lend mostly within national borders. To investigate this point, we hand collect data 
on lending outside the Euro area for 116 (Lending diversification) significantly supervised 
entities (SIs) by the ECBs Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). We expect large banks with 
international reach to offset the negative impact of NIRP on net interest margins and 
profitability. We test this prediction in section 4.3 of the paper.  
We employ several variables to control for bank risk aversion, liquidity, credit risk and bank 
operating efficiency. Several studies (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Saunders and Schumacher, 
2000; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004) use the ratio of equity to total assets (E/TA) 
and Tier1 ratio (Tier1 ratio) as a proxy for bank risk aversion. A positive relation is expected 
between this variable and margins as risk averse banks will require higher margins to cover the 
greater cost of equity (Berger, 1995). We also use liquidity (Carbo and Fernandez, 2007) and 
a credit risk measure (Carbo and Fernandez, 2007; Poghosyan, 2013; Almarzoqi and Naceur, 
2015) to control for bank liquidity and credit risk. In this context, we use the ratio of liquid 
securities to total assets (Liquidity) and loan-loss provisions to total assets (Credit risk), 
respectively. We expect that banks with higher liquidity and credit risk to apply a premium to 
margins. As suggested by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) and Maudos and Solis 
(2009) we measure banks’ management efficiency by using the cost-to-income ratio (Cost-to-
income), defined as the operating cost that is necessary to generate one unit of income. High 
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quality management should be reflected in a more profitable assets composition and lower 
liabilities costs. An increase in this ratio means a decrease in the quality/efficiency of 
management that will translate into lower margins and profits.  
 
Following Angbazo (1997) and Mirzaei et al. (2013), we use the ratio of off-balance sheet 
activities on total assets (Off-balance sheet) to take into account the possibility of hedging 
against interest rate risk. Earlier studies demonstrate a positive relation between bank off-
balance sheet size and margins and profits. On the one hand, off-balance sheet instruments lead 
to higher net interest margins as banks are compensated for increased contingent risk. On the 
other hand, off-balance sheet  items allow banks to expand their assets base thus generating 
more profits. In section 4.3 of the paper, we conduct a sub-sample analysis where we split the 
sample to compare the effect of NIRP among banks that strongly hedge against interest rate 
risk and banks that do not.  
 
In order to control for the impact of bank business models, we employ the variables of bank 
loan growth (Loan growth), non-interest income on gross revenues (Non-interest income), net 
fees and commissions on total assets (Fees & commissions), interest income on total assets 
(Interest income) and interest expenses on total assets (Interest expenses). In section 4.3 of the 
paper, we use non-interest income and fees & commissions to test whether NIRP motivates 
banks to switch from a business model that is ‘interest oriented’ to one that is more ‘service 
oriented’ (Altavilla et al. 2017). As shown in Table 2, the mean value of Loan growth improved 
in the post-NIRP period for the control group from 6.35% to 8.63%. At the same time, the 
ratios on Non-interest income, Fees & commissions, Interest income and Interest expenses 
remain constant in the post-NIRP period for the control group. However, for the treatment 
group, the mean value of Loan growth fell from 3.58% to 3.32% in the post-NIRP period. 
Alongside, the mean value on Interest income declined from 3.02% to 2.55% for the treatment 
group in the post-NIRP period. The mean values on Non-interest income and Fees & 
commissions improved from 35.72% to 37.48% and from 0.77% to 0.80%, respectively, 
indicating that banks in the treatment group moved to a more service- oriented business model 
in the post-NIRP period. In a robustness check in section 4.4 of the paper, we check for the 
different effects that NIRP may have on interest income and interest expenses by including 




Country level controls. Table 1 displays the country-specific variables including: 
macroeconomic performance indicators; measures of banking sector competition; proxies for 
other UMP instruments; and a variable that shows whether floating or fixed interest rates are 
more prevalent in respective countries. We first employ GDP growth (GDP growth), consumer 
price inflation (Inflation), the sovereign bond yield (Yield curve) and the size of credit in the 
economy (Credit-to-GDP) as measures of macroeconomic conditions. Athanasouglu et al. 
(2008) recognise a twofold GDP growth effect on bank performance. On the one hand, GDP 
growth has a positive effect on bank profits coming from a greater demand for loans. In 
contrast, there may be a negative relationship if the supply of funds (deposits) declines due to 
a rise in consumption in-line with GDP growth. The extended literature (Molyneux and 
Thornton, 1992; Boyd et al, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2004; Gelos, 2006; Almarzoqi and 
Naceur, 2015) has also demonstrated a positive relationship between nominal inflation and 
bank margins and profits. Since several studies underline the positive relation between the 
expectation of interest rates and net interest margins and profitability, we also control for the 
slope of the yield curve by using the 10-year government bond return. Finally, to capture the 
importance of bank credit in the economy we include the loan volume to GDP ratio.  
 
As other UMPs, including central bank asset purchase programs (Di Maggio et. al, 2016; 
Kandrac and Schulsche, 2016;  Rodnyanski and Darmouni, 2017; Chakraborty et. al, 2017), 
were conducted at the same time as NIRP, we include variables to account for these effects. In-
line with Gambacorta et al. (2014), Lambert and Ueda (2014), and Alessandri and Nelson 
(2015) we employ the logarithm growth rate of a country’s central bank balance sheet 
(CB_GR). We also use the logarithm growth rate of the monetary base (M0_GR) as a further 
control to isolate the impact of other UMP’s on bank NIMs and ROAs.  
 
Bank profitability and margins may also be driven by banking sector competition. Following 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), Carbo and Fernandez (2007), Hawtrey and Liang 
(2008), Lepetit et al. (2008), Maudos and Solis (2009), Almarzoqi and Naceur (2015) and 
Entrop et al. (2015), we use the Lerner index (Lerner index) to control for competition in the 
banking sector. The Lerner index is the difference between the price and the total marginal cost 
as a proportion of the price of banking services and is taken from the World Bank Global 
Financial Development Database. It ranges between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly). 
NIRP is expected to have a stronger impact in more competitive banking markets as changes 




We also try to disentangle the impact of NIRP on bank margins and profitability in those 
countries that for historical or cultural reasons have a preference for lending at a floating or 
fixed rate basis. We define floating rate countries are those that have a share of variable rate 
loans to total loans greater than 63% (median), and vice versa for fixed-rate countries. One 
would expect the impact of NIRP to be greater in countries where floating rates are more 
prevalent. Following Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) we address this issue by using the 
share of variable rate loans in total loans to households and non-financial corporations 
(floating-fixed rate) taken from the ECB Statistical Warehouse. 
 
Finally, in section 4.4 of the paper, we test the different elasticity of deposit rates and loan rates 
to NIRP. Following Carbo and Fernandez (2007), we define the price of loans as the ratio of 
gross interest income on loans (Loans rate) and the price of deposits as the ratio of interest 
expenses on deposits (Deposits rate).  
 
Further institutional controls. Table 1 presents also further institutional controls relating to: 
total bank reserves (Reserves); taxation (Taxation); depth of credit information (Depth credit 
info); and legal and investors’ rights (Legal rights). Extensive is the literature that takes the 
ratio of cash and balances at the central bank on total assets to capture both the regulatory 
requirement and the opportunity cost of banks to hold less-than-market remunerated reserves 
at the central bank (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga., 1999; Angbazo, 1997, Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Gelos, 2006; Maudos and Solis, 2009; Almarzoqi and Naceur, 
2015). The effect of bank reserves on profitability and margins could be either positive or 
negative. The relation may be negative as under-remunerated reserves lower net interest 
income and profitability. Alternatively, if banks pass the cost of reserves onto bank customers, 
we should expect a positive relationship.  
 
We also include the ratio of taxes on operating income (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga., 1999; 
Gelos., 2006) to take into account the direct effect of corporate income taxes on bank margins 
and profits, as banks may try to pass through increases in corporate income taxes to bank 
customers. In-line with Gelos (2006) and Almarzoqi and Naceur (2015), we also use a depth 
of credit information index that measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of 
credit information available through public or private credit registries. The index ranges from 
0 to 8, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information (from either a 
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public registry or a private bureau) to facilitate lending decisions. Banks are likely to require 
higher margins if credit information is poor. Finally, we control for the strength of legal rights 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga., 1999; Gelos., 2006; Poghosyan., 2013; Almarzoqi and Naceur, 
2015). The legal rights index ranges from 0 to 12 and measures the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy law protect the rights of lenders. The higher the score the stronger the legal 
protection in a certain country. We expect that weak contract enforcement and inefficient 
collateral reconciliation may prompt banks and investors to require higher margins and profits 
to compensate for the additional risk.   
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 Baseline results   
 
Our baseline results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Tables 3. Our main interest 
is the size, sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of 𝛽𝛽1 that represents the average 
difference in the change of NIMs and ROAs between countries that adopted NIRP and those 
that did not, denoted in the table as the NIRP-effect. In the regression results denoted as Table 
3, the coefficients of NIRP-effect are sizeable, negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
and 5% level for NIMs and ROAs, respectively.  Countries where central banks implemented 
NIRP experienced a decline in NIMs and ROAs of 16.41% and 3.06%, respectively, compared 
to countries that did not adopt NIRP. In-line with expectations, the size of the coefficient on 
NIMs is larger than that of ROAs. Overall, this result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
NIRP has a negative impact on bank margins and profits. It also indicates that the contraction 
in NIMs (as a key component of bank profitability) indirectly drags down bank ROAs but to a 
lesser extent – a fall in margins reduces profits but not to the same extent as the overall effect 
is likely mitigated by higher non-interest income (via increased fees and commissions, security 
valuations, trading income and such like).4  
(Insert Table 3) 
 
                                                          
4 We test this hypothesis in the following section of the paper.  
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The covariates are mostly significant at conventional levels with signs in-line with the literature 
on the determinants of NIMs and ROAs. Size is mostly negative and statistically significant 
for NIMs suggesting that small banks have lower margins than their larger counterparts. The 
E/TA variable is positively correlated to both NIMs and ROAs implying that less leveraged 
banks register higher margins and profits. In contrast, Liquidity is negatively related to both 
NIMs and ROAs revealing that banks that are less liquid apply higher margins to compensate 
for greater risks. The control variable of Loan growth is positively related to both NIMs and 
ROAs showing that lending volume is a strong determinant of bank margins and profits. In 
contrast, the Cost-to-Income ratio displays a negative relationship to both the dependent 
variables. Efficient management translates into higher margins and profits. As expected, Credit 
risk is positively correlated with NIMs and negatively with ROAs. On one hand, banks with 
large non-performing assets apply higher margins to compensate for the excessive risk. On the 
other hand, banks with deteriorating loan quality in their balance sheets face lower profitability. 
Among the macroeconomic variables, Inflation displays a strong positive coefficient for both 
NIMs and ROAs suggesting that the low inflation decade since the GFC is another factor 
affecting banking sector performance. Depth of credit also illustrates a significant negative 
relation with NIMs. Poor credit information results in higher margins required by banks. 
Credit-to-GDP is negatively related with NIMs indicating that banks operating in countries 
with less developed financial sectors apply higher margins. As expected, the Yield curve is 
positively related with NIMs. This result is in-line with the literature examined in section 2. 
Finally, Taxation is positive for both NIMs and ROAs suggesting that banks that pay higher 
taxes pass through corporate income taxes to bank customers.  
 
4.2. Propensity Score Matching – Difference-in-Differences 
 
As previously described, one of the difference-in-differences assumptions requires that the 
control group must constitute a valid counterfactual for the treatment. Although we provide 
evidence (section 3.1) that both the treatment and the control group experience a similar 
macroeconomic environment in the years following the financial crisis, we further test this 
assumption by constructing a control sample using propensity score matching (PSM) as 
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The predicted probability (propensity score) of 
NIRP to be undertaken by a country is obtained from the estimation of a Probit model. We use 
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macroeconomic variables (GDP and the inflation rate) to match banks operating in NIRP 
adopter and non-adopter countries. Furthermore, to make sure that the propensity score 
predicted from the Probit model is successful in controlling for bank-specific differences 
between treated and the comparison group in the pre-NIRP period, we include bank size, equity 
strength, and lending growth in the propensity score estimation.  The propensity score matching 
model can be represented as follow: 
 




where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable describing the treatment status. D=1 if the bank has been affected 
by the policy, and D=0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observable macroeconomic variables and 
bank characteristics in the two years prior to NIRP and δ is a standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. Specifically, we implement kernel matching (Heckman et al. 1998) with 
weighted averages of all the banks in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. 
The advantage of using Kernel matching is the relatively smaller variances resulting from the 
fact that more information is used in the estimation. The results from the Probit model, used to 
generate propensity scores of being affected by NIRP, are presented in Table 4. As displayed, 
the majority of the covariates are significant at the 1% level suggesting that banks operating in 
countries with weaker economic prospects (represented by lower GDP growth (GDP growth) 
and low inflation (Inflation)) have a greater probability of being affected by the negative 
interest rate policy. Moreover, countries with banks that are small (Size), with lower loan 
growth (Loan growth) and that are less capitalised (E/TA) tend to have a higher probability to 
be the target of NIRP. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The results from the PSM matching difference-in-differences estimations are presented in 
Table 5. As shown, matched banks NIMs and ROAs display a sizeable and statistically 





(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
 
4.3 NIRP Results Based on Bank and Country Sub-Sample Analyses5  
 
As suggested by Bech and Malkhozov (2015), Jobst and Lin (2016), Arteta et al. (2016), 
Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) and IMF (2017), the contraction in NIMs and erosion of 
profitability should be more marked for small banks operating in competitive markets. We also 
expect the influence of NIRP to vary for banks with specific product-line specialisations and 
that operate in countries where floating rate assets are more prevalent. If competition from 
other banks is sufficient, lending rates should decrease, and if deposit rates are already low, 
then margins will be compressed. This effect should be stronger for small retail banks relying 
on deposits as a source of funding. Banks that hold mostly floating interest rate loans face 
stronger compression of NIMs as lending rates for new loans decline and existing (variable-
rate) loans re-price while deposit rates remain sticky-downward. Also banks with a specific 
product line specialisation (such as real estate mortgages) that have a higher portion of long-
term assets in their portfolio (facing stronger maturity mismatch risk), should also be more 
highly affected by NIRP. In contrast, large banks with a more diversified business model, 
greater potential to increase lending in NIRP non-affected countries and stronger interest rate 
risk hedging behaviour will be able to anticipate the reduction of net interest margins by: 
increasing non-interest income via fees and commissions; increasing net interest income by 
lending in monetary regimes not affected by NIRP; and using derivatives to hedge against 
interest rate risk. In the following sections, we focus on the role of bank size, bank business 
model, market competition, asset interest rate composition, capitalisation and bank 
specialisation. 
 
4.3.1 NIRP and Bank Size  
                                                          
5 Beside the subsample analyses conducted in this section of the paper, various others have been carried out. 
Specifically, we investigate the effect of NIRP on: countries in surplus/deficits; where there is different bank 
activity restrictions; for various types of bank risk-taking and also on government owned banks. Although not 
reported, these results are available upon request.  
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First, we examine the impact of NIRP on NIMs and ROAs by running percentile regressions 
based on size.6 The results reported in Table 6 can be summarised as follows. First, the largest 
banks show a statistically insignificant contraction in margins (panel A in Column 1) in 
comparison to the smallest banks that display a compression in margins of 17.83% (Panel A in 
Column 7). Second, NIRP positively affects large bank profitability as demonstrated by the 
statistical significance of the coefficient (Panel B in Column 2). Following dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2010), this result suggests that NIRP enables large wholesale funded banks to take greater 
advantage of declining funding costs partially offsetting pressure on margins and profitability. 
Second, the coefficients get larger in magnitude as bank size shrinks. This is consistent with 
the literature mentioned in Section 1 indicating that large banks, through hedging and lending 
and income diversification, are better able to protect themselves against interest rate risk. 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
To gain further insights into these large bank behaviours, we investigate whether  
diversification opportunities allows the largest banks to anticipate the reduction in net interest 
margins by shifting towards a more service orientated business model. Table 7 (Panel A and 
B) shows the estimates based on bank size for the impact on non-interest income (NII) and fees 
and commissions income (FEE). The results confirm the hypothesis that the large banks adapt 
their business model according to the monetary policy environment and increase non-interest 
income and fees and commission income. 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
4.3.2 NIRP and Bank Business Model 
Furthermore, we test whether banks that strongly hedge against interest rate risk are less 
affected by NIRP. We use the ratio of off-balance sheet items (OBS) on total assets and split 
the sample according to the median level of OBS, defining as the sub-sample of strongly 
                                                          
6 We define banks in the first percentile as having an asset size smaller than $300 million. Banks in the second 
percentile with an asset size between $300 million and $1 billion. Banks in the third percentile an asset size 
between $1 and $4 billion. Banks in the last percentile with an asset size larger than $4 billion. 
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hedged banks with more than 6% of off-balance sheet to total assets ratio, vice versa for the 
group of weakly-hedged. The assumption is that the larger the amount of OBS items the more 
likely that interest rate risk will be hedged. The results are displayed in Table 8 (Panel A). As 
expected and in-line with recent papers investigating the low interest rate environment on 
interest rate risk (Chaudron, 2018), we find that large banks with substantial off-balance sheet 
activities are likely to hedge against interest rate risk more effectively – they display lower net 
interest margin contraction as well as higher ROAs (although not statistically significant). 
 
In Panel B of Table 8, we test whether large banks with greater international reach and potential 
to increase lending abroad offset the negative impact of NIRP on bank margins and profitability 
by diversifying lending in monetary regimes unaffected by negative interest rates. For this test, 
we hand collect data on lending inside and outside the Euro area for 116 significantly 
supervised entities (SIs) regulated by the ECBs Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). We 
reckon SIs represent a suitable sample as these banks operate globally and therefore have 
substantial lending diversification opportunities. To match the SIs with suitable banks 
belonging to the control group, we apply the nearest neighbour PSM approach. Specifically, 
we match control group banks that have size and lending similar to the SIs treatment group. 
Once again, the results suggest that large banks did not face a reduction of net interest margins 
and return on assets after NIRP when compared with a control group of banks with similar 
characteristics. This is also in-line with Altavilla et al. (2017) who employ a sample of 288 
large European banks and did not find any effect of the low interest rate environment on bank 
profitability. This result has also important policy implications in terms of financial stability. 
Since the effect on SI banks is small and not statistically significant, it is therefore less critical 
for financial stability purposes.  
 
4.3.3 NIRP and Banking Sector Competition 
In Panel C of Table 8, we assess the impact of NIRP in the context of competitive conditions 
in banking markets. In this case, we use the Lerner index as a proxy for competitive conditions.7 
Sørensen and Werner (2006) argue that banks operating in a less competitive environment 
make slower adjustments to interest rates (and therefore to NIMs), which slows the 
                                                          
7 For this exercise, similar tests were also undertaken using the Boone index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). The results (not reported but available upon request) are similar to those using the Lerner index. 
23 
 
transmission of monetary policy. Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) present a “reversal interest 
rate” hypothesis according to which there is a rate of interest at which 
accommodative monetary policy “reverses” its effect and becomes contractionary. They show 
that low interest policy is likely to have a more limiting effect on bank lending in competitive 
markets because of the associated pressure on NIMs. As the Lerner index varies between 0 and 
1, we split the sample according to the median of the Lerner index, defining as more-
competitive those banking sectors with a Lerner index below 0.24, and vice versa for less-
competitive. The results, reported in Panel C of Table 8 confirm our hypothesis and support 
the aforementioned studies: namely that the impact of NIRP on bank profits and margins in 
competitive markets is negative and statistically significant. In less competitive markets in 
contrast, the impact of NIRP is negative but statistically insignificant for NIM while positive 
and statistically significant for ROA suggesting that banks here are better able to maintain 
profitability as they face less competition and downward lending rates pressure. 
 
4.3.4 NIRP and Fixed/Floating Lending Rate Countries 
In Panel D of Table 8, we try to disentangle the effect of NIRP for floating-rate and fixed-rate 
countries. According to Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Jobst and Lin (2016) and 
Brunnermeier and Koby (2016), the impact of NIRP should have a greater effect on variable-
rate loans and on new loans. Hence, banks having a higher proportion of outstanding floating 
rate loans/assets should be strongly adversely affected by the new monetary regime compared 
to those that rely more on fixed rate assets. The ECB’s Statistical Warehouse provides data on 
the share of variable rate loans in total loans to households and non-financial corporations. 
Again, we split the sample dividing the treatment group into floating and fixed rate countries 
according to the median (see Table 2 for a list of floating and fixed rate countries). For this 
exercise, we consider a floating rate country as having a share of variable rate loans to total 
loans greater than 63%, and vice versa for fixed-rate countries. The results confirm a negative 
and significant relationship between NIRP and NIM in countries where floating loan rates 
prevail. In countries with a high percentage of fixed loan rates, NIRP boosted ROA by cutting 
bank funding cost without diminishing the lending rate.   
 
4.3.5 NIRP and Bank Capitalisation 
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As a further test, we investigate whether negative interest rates have a diverse effect depending 
on the level of bank capitalisation. When banks have little capital, the increase in the cost of 
funding can dominate increases in loan rates as banks face difficulties in raising capital. In such 
a scenario, NIRP should have a greater effect on banks that are less capitalised. However, it is 
also true that banks that hold capital in excess of that required by regulations face an 
opportunity cost and profitability pressure as excessive capital could be employed for profitable 
investment opportunities. In our sample banks are, on average, well-capitalised (the median 
level is 14.37%). When we split the sample according to the median level of capital (using the 
Tier1 ratio), we discover that banks with lower capital ratios keep-up profitability to mitigate 
the negative impact of negative rates on net interest margins and profits. Banks that are well 
capitalised suffered more from NIRP. This result is shown in Panel E of Table 8. This result 
adds also to the ongoing debate on the benefits and costs of bank capital under tight macro 
prudential policies.  
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
4.3.6 NIRP and Bank Product-line Specialisation  
As a final test, we try to capture differences in bank specialisation. As suggested by Hanweck 
and Ryu (2005) banks with different product-line specialisations tend to have distinctive 
business models and consequently they exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity to interest rate 
risk. The magnitude of this effect depends on the composition and repricing of existing assets 
and liabilities. Banks that have a higher proportion of net long-term assets in their portfolios 
should experience a greater contraction in their NIMs as interest rates decline. Accordingly, 
we divide the sample into different bank types (bank holding companies, commercial banks, 
cooperative banks, finance companies, real estate mortgage specialists and savings banks) 
relying on the classification provided by Orbis Bank Focus. The results are displayed in Table 
9 (Panels A and B). As expected, real estate mortgage specialists and finance companies face 
strong NIM and ROA compression after the introduction of negative rates in comparison with 
the control group. The results demonstrate a similar negative and significant effect of NIRP on 
the performance of commercial banks, cooperative banks and saving banks. This negative and 
significant effect disappears in the group of bank holding companies, which is in-line with our 




(Insert Table 9 here) 
 
 4.4 Further Robustness Checks 
 
4.4.1 Lending Rates, Deposit Rates, Interest Income and Interest Expense 
 
 NIRP induces reductions in interest rates to motivate banks to run down their excess reserve 
balances. However, since deposits (may) have a “price floor” set at zero, a decline in lending 
rates can lead to a contraction in NIMs.8 We control for this effect by including in our analysis 
both lending rate and deposit rates. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 10 (columns 
1-2). As expected, Loans rate displays a strong positive relation to NIMs (column 1) suggesting 
that higher interest rates on lending are associated with high net interest margins. In contrast, 
Deposits rate has negative sign (column 1) indicating that lower deposit rates allow banks to 
benefit from reduced funding costs. The coefficients between NIM and NIRP retain their 
significance level with magnitudes in-line with the baseline regressions. The significance of 
the coefficients between ROA and NIRP drops-off due to the fact that a narrowed NIM will 
motivate banks to compensate the loss by focusing on fee and commission income. In order to 
identify the individual effect of lending and deposit rates on bank performance we employ 
Interest income and Interest expenses as dependent variables in our econometric specifications. 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 10 (columns 3-4) confirm a negative and significant 
effect of NIRP on both interest expense and interest income. However, the larger magnitude of 
the interest income coefficient supports the hypothesis that NIRP has a bigger effect on interest 
income as deposit rates are sticky downward. Most banks have not passed on the negative 
interest rates to their customers. Banks that rely on deposits are reluctant to reduce rates, fearing 
the loss of their funding base. It appears that the mismatch between sticky deposit rates and 
competitive loan rates diminishes bank interest income more than the beneficial effect of NIRP 
on interest expenses in terms of reduced wholesale funding costs. 
 
4.4.2 Other Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 
                                                          
8 However, as explained in the previous section, in countries like Sweden and Denmark, where banks operate in 
a highly concentrated banking system they may find it easier to lower retail deposit rates below zero.  
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NIRP was brought into the UMP mix by central banks several years after the adoption of other 
UMPs, and in particular, the extensive use of outright asset purchases via QE. It is important 
to disentangle the effects of NIRP on profitability and margins from the effects of these 
policies. Outright asset purchases were aimed at expanding the central bank’s balance sheet to 
increase the level of the monetary base, encouraging banks to lend – in order (ultimately) to 
boost nominal spending (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). Accordingly, we proxy for the use of 
other UMPs by including, alternatively, variables that take into account the central bank 
balance sheet size and (alternatively) the size of the monetary base. The results reported in 
Panel B of Table 10 (columns 1-4) are in-line with the studies of Lambert and Ueda (2014) and 
Alessandri and Nelson (2015) underlining the possible negative effect of UMP on margins.9 
However, unlike NIRP, other UMP improved bank profitability measured by ROA by 
facilitating higher credit supply and better funding conditions. In contrast, the results of NIRP 
confirm that negative rates have squeezed both bank margins and profitability. 
 
4.4.3 Splitting the Sample at the European Level and Removing Countries that introduced 
NIRP in 2015. 
 
As further robustness checks, we alter our country sample in two ways. Firstly, we focus only 
on European countries where the treatment group includes only European NIRP adopters and 
the control group includes only European non-NIRP adopters. Second, we remove late NIRP 
–adopter countries, namely Switzerland (adoption in January 2015), Norway (September 2015) 
and Sweden (February 2015) to see whether the results hold. Splitting the sample in multiple 
control and treatment groups helps also to reduce biases and unobservable variables associated 
with just one comparison. These results are reported in Panels C and D of Table 10 (columns 
1 to 4). The coefficients of NIRP in both cases remain negative and statistically significant. 
 
                                                          
9It might be the case that both UMPs and NIRP have a positive impact on non-interest income that could offset 
the negative effects of declines in NIM on profitability. We complement the analysis of the non-interest income 
baseline regression by adding M0_growth as a UMP control. The result (not reported) shows that both NIRP and 
UMPs affect positively non-interest income. However, the overall negative effect on ROA displayed in the 
baseline regression indicates that the negative effects of NIMs on bank profits outweigh the positive effect of 
greater non-interest income and so profitability still falls. This last point has been further examined in section 4.3 




4.4.4 Placebo Tests  
 
We report two final robustness checks. First, we try to eliminate the possibility that bank 
margins and profitability in the treatment group may have altered prior to the introduction of 
NIRP—for example, in anticipation of the adverse effects of NIRP, or for some bank-specific 
reasons—thereby invalidating our choice of DiD estimation. If the estimated coefficients on 
the ‘false’ NIRP are not statistically significant, we can be more confident that our baseline 
coefficient is capturing a genuine monetary policy shock. Moreover, it allows us to control for 
the difference between low and negative interest rate environments. In Panel E of Table 10 we 
report results from estimates in which we extend our sample to the period from 2011 – 2014 
setting the introduction of a “fake” NIRP in 2013. The coefficient on the NIRP variable is still 
negative but smaller and not statistically significant adding further support to the validity of 
our baseline estimation. Second, our research question is to investigate whether bank- and 
country-specific characteristics amplify or ease the effect of NIRP on bank performance. 
However, banks in each country are heterogeneous and they can be affected differently by 
NIRP. Hence, at an aggregate level, there can be a neutral overall effect as banks that suffer 
from the introduction of NIRP counterbalance those that benefit from the policy. If we do not 
find any significant relationship between NIRP and margins and profits at the aggregate level, 
we can be more confident that our results are driven by bank-specific characteristics. The 
results in Panel F of Table 10 strengthen our findings. The NIRP-effect is not significant when 
we conduct cross-country comparisons by averaging banks in each country to document 
aggregate effects. This provides further evidence that the effect of NIRP depends on the 
aforementioned bank-specific features.  
 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Since 2012, several central banks have adopted NIRP aimed at boosting real spending by 
facilitating an increase in the supply of bank loans. The policy has generated controversy with 
skeptics pointing to several factors that might affect the soundness of financial institutions and 
complicate the transmission from negative policy rates to higher bank lending. One factor that 
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has been mentioned is that NIRP could compress NIMs and, therefore, bank profits, which may 
erode bank capital bases via a reduction in retained earnings posing financial instability 
concerns. Reduced retained earnings and the subsequent erosion of bank capital  may also limit 
the transmission of NIRP to bank lending as retained earnings are the most important source 
of bank’s own funds (Shin., 2016). This creates a vicious circle where squeezed margins and 
low profits limit bank’s ability to retain earnings and build capital buffers ultimately increasing 
risks as well as stifling NIRP monetary transmission.  
 
In this paper, we provide new evidence that bank margins and profitability fared worse in 
NIRP-adopter countries than in countries that did not adopt the policy. Specifically, countries 
in which central banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in NIMs and ROAs of 16.41% 
and 3.06%, respectively, compared to those countries in which central banks did not follow 
this policy. Furthermore, our evidence points also to a dichotomy between non-binding 
monetary policy goals and binding capital requirements. This suggests a policy coordination 
dilemma where NIRP tries to boost lending growth at a time when prudential requirements 
force banks to hold greater amount of higher quality capital and liquidity.  
 
Our findings also show that the effect of NIRP on margins and profitability depends upon bank- 
and country-specific factors. For instance, large banks are able to mitigate the negative effect 
of NIRP on NIMs and ROAs through hedging, lending diversification and by switching from 
interest to non-interest oriented business models. Consequently, small banks appear to be more 
affected by the policy. Among country-specific factors we find NIRP to have a stronger adverse 
effect on bank profitability in competitive banking sectors and in countries where floating 
interest rates predominate. These results hold and are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of 
bank-specific, institutional and macroeconomic control variables. They also stand-up in the 
face of a broad range of robustness checks, including controlling for the effects of lending and 
deposits rates, other forms of unconventional monetary policy, sub-sample analysis, aggregate 
effects, and to (possible) changes prior to the introduction of NIRP. Overall, the adverse impact 
of NIRP on margins and profits appears to have been stronger for banks that: are small; have 
‘interest-oriented’ business models; are real estate and mortgage specialists; are well 
capitalised; lend within national borders; weakly hedge against interest rate risk; operate in 
competitive banking systems; and where floating loan rates predominate. These empirical 
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results revealed from the paper calls for greater policy emphasis on the appropriate supervision 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic and institutional variables descriptive statistics divided by the treatment and control group (percentage values). 
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T-test      0.26** 1.33*** -4.27*** 0.36 -21.21** 2.49 0.62 0.10*** 1.31*** 0.05*** 2.03*** 1.25*** 1.21*** 2.06*** 
NIRP-affected floating rate countries: Germany, Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia. 
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NIRP-affected fixed rate countries: Denmark, France, Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands and Slovakia, 
 
Note: The Table displays mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for the sample of countries divided by the treatment (Treatment group) and control group (Control 
group). NIRP adoption displays the time of adoption of NIRP. Number of banks is the number of banks used in the sample by country. GDP growth is the yearly growth rate 
of real GDP. Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index in percentage. Unemployment is the yearly level of unemployment in percentage. Yield curve is the 10-year 
government bond return. Credit-to-GDP is the ratio of aggregate gross loans to real GDP. CB_GR is the logarithmic yearly growth rate of central bank total assets. M0_GR is 
the logarithmic yearly growth rate of the money supply M0. Lerner index is the Lerner index. Loans rate is the ratio of interest on loans to total gross loans. Deposits rate is the 
ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. Reserve is the ratio of cash and balances at the central bank on total assets. Taxation is the ratio of taxes on operating income. Depth 
credit info is the depth of credit information index. Legal rights is the legal rights index. Floating-Fixed Rate is the share of variable loans in total loans to household and non-
financial corporation. Floating rate countries are those that have a share of variable rate loans to total loans greater than 63% (median), and vice versa for fixed-rate countries. 
T-test difference in means between Mean treatment and Mean control is also reported in the Table. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Figure 1. Average NIM and ROA among treated banks (blue line) and non-treated banks (red 
line) from 2011 – 2016. Correlation of NIM and ROA among the treatment and control group 
prior to NIRP-introduction is 0.94 for NIM and 0.58 for ROA, respectively. Correlation of 
NIM and ROA among the treatment and control group after NIRP-introduction is -0.87 for 




Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total 























































ROA before & after NIRP
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  Pre-NIRP NIRP Period 
Variables Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min  Max Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min  Max 
           
Panel A: Bank Profitability and Margins 
NIM 8916 2.06%*** 0.95% 0.49% 4.12% 8040 1.92%*** 0.78% 0.49% 4.12% 
ROA 9025 0.47%*** 0.59% 0.00% 2.29% 8108 0.40%*** 0.97% 0.00% 2.29% 
Panel B: Bank Balance Sheet 
Size 9048 13.79*** 1.59 11.51 16.58 8138 13.76*** 1.58 11.51 16.58 
Lending 
diversification 250 0.81% 0.20% 0.02% 0.69% 330 0.80% 0.20% 0.01% 0.69% 
E/TA 9046 10.06%*** 5.28% 4.07% 21.76% 8136 10.22%*** 5.01% 4.07% 21.76% 
Tier1 ratio 5158 14.70%*** 4.46% 9.88 23.99 5306 16.16%*** 4.54% 10.70 25.00 
Liquidity 8549 21.00%*** 14.00% 1.00% 46.00% 7895 21.73% 15.09% 0.07% 46.68% 
Credit risk 8111 0.29%*** 0.41% 0.00% 1.17% 7401 0.25% 0.42% 0.00% 1.17% 
Cost-to-income 5042 71.35%*** 15.11% 47.09% 95.28% 7664 72.70%*** 15.00% 47.09% 95.28% 
Loan growth 8131 3.58%*** 6.66% -7.27% 15.36% 7630 3.32%*** 6.45% -7.27% 15.36% 
Off-balance sheet 4505 7.88%*** 6.16% 1.65% 21.46% 6549 7.67%*** 6.12% 1.65% 21.46% 
Non-interest 
income 
8842 35.72%*** 23.45% 12.50% 87.67% 8019 37.48% 22.90% 12.50% 87.67% 
Fees & 
Commissions 
8662 0.77%*** 0.60% 0.00% 2.16% 7855 0.80%*** 0.59% 0.00% 2.16% 
Interest income 4658 3.02%*** 1.13% 1.06% 3.67% 7145 2.55%*** 0.79% 1.06% 3.67% 
Interest expenses 4609 1.17%*** 0.64% 0.25% 1.65% 7066 0.82%*** 0.43% 0.25% 1.65% 
 
 
          
 
CONTROL 
  Pre-NIRP NIRP Period 
Variables Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min  Max Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min  Max 
           
Panel C: Bank Profitability and Margin 
NIM 4686 2.92%*** 1.71% 0.39% 6.15% 4331 2.93%*** 1.65% 0.39% 6.15% 
ROA 4811 1.03%*** 1.00% -0.10% 3.26% 4457 1.03%*** 0.97% -0.10% 3.26% 
Panel D: Bank Balance Sheet 
Size 5008 14.33*** 1.98 11.21 17.63 4650 14.36*** 2.07 11.21 17.63 
E/TA 5006 16.46%*** 13.93% 5.47% 51.27% 4648 16.66%*** 13.89% 5.47% 51.27% 
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Tier1 ratio 2287 15.62%*** 4.28 9.88 23.99 2101 15.63%*** 4.45% 9.88 23.99 
Liquidity 4374 22.00%*** 19.00% 1.00% 64.00% 4341 22.04% 20.13% 0.09% 64.85% 
Credit risk 3760 0.33%*** 0.39% 0.00% 1.21% 3504 0.26% 0.38% 0.00% 1.21% 
Cost-to-income 3319 63.87%*** 16.08% 37.68% 90.89% 4135 65.46%*** 16.60% 37.68% 90.89% 
Loan growth 3735 6.35%*** 12.92% -11.50% 31.12% 3759 8.63%*** 11.99% -11.5% 31.12% 
Off-balance sheet 2040 21.98%*** 22.17% 0.70% 72.46% 2472 22.16%*** 22.55% 0.71% 72.46% 
Non-interest 
income 
4534 38.10%*** 29.94% 5.02% 96.61% 4349 37.33% 29.63% 5.02% 96.61% 
Fees & 
Commissions 
4236 0.58%*** 0.68% 0.00% 2.10% 3948 0.59%*** 0.67% 0.00% 2.10% 
Interest income 2456 3.45%*** 1.52% 0.83% 5.79% 3137 3.25%*** 1.62% 0.83% 5.79% 
Interest expenses 2380 1.27%*** 0.97% 0.20% 2.81% 3034 1.19%*** 0.96% 0.20% 2.81% 
 
Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total 
interest earning assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of bank 
total assets. Lending diversification is the ratio of loans inside the Euro area on total loans taken for a sample of 
SSM supervised banks (treatment group). E/TA is the ratio of bank equity to total assets. Tier 1 ratio is the Tier1 
ratio as reported for regulatory purposes. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid securities to total assets. Credit risk 
is the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets. Cost-to-income is the ratio of operating expenses to operating 
income. Loan growth is the logarithm growth rate of gross loans. Off-balance sheet is the ratio of off-balance 
sheet items to total assets. Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to gross revenues. Fees & 
commissions is the ratio of net fees and commissions to total assets. Interest income is the ratio of interest income 
to total assets. Interest expenses is the ratio of interest expenses on total assets. T-test difference in means between 
Mean treatment and Mean control prior and after NIRP is also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 




















Table 3. The effect of NIRP on NIM and ROA. 
 NIM ROA 
   
NIRP-Effect -0.1641*** -0.0306** 
 (0.0183) (0.0139) 
Size -0.1239*** 0.0038 
 (0.0080) (0.0036) 
E/TA 0.0234*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0018) 
Liquidity -0.5165*** -0.1135*** 
 (0.0708) (0.0411) 
Loan growth 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Cost-to-income -0.0041*** -0.0140*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Credit risk 24.5769*** -27.2195*** 
 (2.1916) (1.6302) 
GDP growth -0.0229 0.0292* 
 (0.0190) (0.0150) 
Inflation 0.0610*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0049) 
Depth credit info -0.0379*** -0.0048 
 (0.0079) (0.0083) 
Legal rights 0.1904*** 0.0670** 
 (0.0450) (0.0323) 
Credit-to-GDP -0.0039*** 0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Yield curve 0.0199*** -0.0053 
 (0.0059) (0.0046) 
Taxation 1.5347*** 0.4216** 
 (0.1688) (0.1675) 
Reserves 0.2768 0.7155*** 
 (0.2669) (0.1947) 
   
Observations 17,271 17,286 
R-squared 0.513 0.566 
Number of banks 4,612 4,612 
Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total 
interest earning assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. NIRP-effect is the interaction between 
the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after 
NIRP implementation, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. E/TA is the ratio of bank 
equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid securities to total assets. Cost-to-income is the ratio of 
operating expenses to operating income. Credit risk is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets. Loan growth 
is the logarithm growth rate of gross loans. GDP growth is the yearly growth rate of real GDP. Inflation is the 
yearly Consumer Price Index in percentage. Depth credit info is the depth of credit information index. Legal rights 
is the legal rights index. Credit-to-GDP is the ratio of aggregate gross loans to real GDP. Yield curve is the 10-
year government bond return. Taxation is the ratio of taxes on operating income. Reserve is the ratio of cash and 
balances at the central bank on total assets. All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard 









Table 4. Propensity score estimation: Probit model 
 
  NIM ROA 
   
GDP growth -4.6537*** -4.6595*** 
 (0.0870) (0.0870) 
Inflation -1.1712*** -1.1742*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0279) 
Size -0.1934*** -0.1924*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0106) 
E/TA -0.0468*** -0.0465*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Loan growth -0.0097*** -0.0098*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0018) 
Observations 11677 11730 
Pseudo R square 0.5460 0.5468 
Log Likelihood -3291.54 -3300.36 
LR test ( chi square) 7918.52 7964.23 
Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total 
interest earning assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. GDP growth is the yearly growth rate 
of real GDP. Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index in percentage. Size is the natural logarithm of bank 
total assets. E/TA is the ratio of bank equity to total assets. Loan growth is the logarithm growth rate of gross 
loans. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 











Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total 
interest earning assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. NIRP-effect is the interaction between 
the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after 
   
  NIM ROA 
   
NIRP-effect -0.1220*** -0.1010*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0140) 
Country FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 22331 22520 
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NIRP implementation, 0 otherwise. All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. The influence of NIRP on NIM and ROA by splitting the sample in four percentiles based on bank size. 
                 
  Bank Size>75th percentile Bank Size>50th & <75th percentile Bank Size>25th & <50th percentile Bank Size<25th percentile 
  NIM(1) ROA(2) NIM(3) ROA(4) NIM(5) ROA(6) NIM(7) ROA(8) 
Panel A.  
NIRP-effect -0.0032  -0.1321***  -0.1695***  -0.1783***  
 (0.0203)  (0.0239)  (0.0281)  (0.0466)  
 
Panel B.          
NIRP-effect  0.0358**  -0.0670***  -0.0695***  -0.1409*** 
  (0.0183)  (0.0214)  (0.0254)  (0.0320) 
         
R2 0.3552 0.2780 0.3102 0.2942 0.3711 0.2562 0.2956 0.1532 
N.banks 1843 1855 2084 2115 2177 2195 2074 2159 
N.Obs 6468 6514 6563 6637 6581 6629 6361 6621 
T-test Bank size>25th  & <50th = Bank size <25th  1.93*** 
T-test Bank size >25th  & <50th = Bank size>50th & <75th  1.27***   
T-test Bank size >75th = Bank size>50th & <75th                                0.69*** 
Note: Panel A displays difference-in-differences regression results of NIRP on NIM split by bank size percentiles. Panel B shows difference-in-differences regression results 
of NIRP on ROA split by bank size percentiles. NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total interest earning 
assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. NIRP-effect is the interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country 
j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP implementation, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. We define banks in the first percentile as having an asset 
size smaller than $300 million. Banks in the second percentile with an asset size between $300 million and $1 billion. Banks in the third percentile an asset size between $1 
and $4 billion. Banks in the last percentile with an asset size larger than $4 billion. All the percentile regressions include fixed country and time effects. T-test for difference in 










Table 7. The influence of NIRP on non-interest income and fees and commissions by splitting the sample in four percentiles based on bank size. 
                 
  Bank Size>75th percentile Bank Size>50th & <75th percentile Bank Size>25th & <50th percentile Bank Size<25th percentile 
  NII(1) FEE(2) NII(3) FEE(4) NII(5) FEE(6) NII(7) FEE(8) 
Panel A.          
NIRP-effect 2.5876***  3.476***  3.0223***  0.770  
 (0.443)  (0.489)  (0.602)  (0.835)  
Panel B         
NIRP-effect  0.0004***  0.0003***  0.0002  -0.00004 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
         
R2 0.0999 0.1090 0.1340 0.1000 0.1562 0.1440 0.1528 0.0947 
N.banks 1950 1765 2079 1970 2165 2076 2091 1945 
N.Obs 6499 6197 6476 6234 6493 6309 6276 5961 
T-test Bank size>25th  & <50th = Bank size <25th  1.93*** 
T-test Bank size >25th  & <50th = Bank size>50th & <75th  1.27***   
T-test Bank size >75th = Bank size>50th & <75th                                0.69*** 
Note: Panel A displays difference-in-differences regression results of NIRP on NII split by bank size percentiles. Panel B shows difference-in-differences regression results of 
NIRP on FEE split by bank size percentiles Non-interest income (NII) is the ratio of non-interest income on gross revenues. Fees & commissions (FEE) is the ratio of fees and 
commissions income to total assets. NIRP-effect is the interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected 
by NIRP after NIRP implementation, 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. We define banks in the first percentile as having an asset size smaller than 
$300 million. Banks in the second percentile with an asset size between $300 million and $1 billion. Banks in the third percentile an asset size between $1 and $4 billion. Banks 
in the last percentile with an asset size larger than $4 billion. All the percentile regressions include fixed country and time effects. T-test for difference in means among 
percentiles is reported. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8. The effect of NIRP on banks that: strongly (weakly) hedge against interest rate risk; 
have diversified lending; operate in more (less) competitive markets; in countries where 
floating (fixed) rates predominate; and for levels of bank capital.  
  NIM(1) ROA(2)   NIM(3) ROA(4) T-test 
Panel A.       
Weak-hedging     Strong hedging 65.94%*** 
NIRP-Effect -0.2048*** -0.0623** 
 -0.0887*** 0.0164  
 (0.0299) (0.0243)  (0.0211) (0.0171)  
R-squared 0.295 0.246  0.352 0.291  
N.Banks 3,152 3,168  2,793 2,806  
N.Obs 10,394 10,448   8,914 8,951   
Panel B.        
Lending Diversification 
      
NIRP-Effect 0.0768 -0.0292      -0.0614 -0.0309     
R2 0.0107 0.0309     
N.Banks 224 225     
N.Obs 896 900         
Panel C.  
     
 
More Competitive     Less Competitive   0.20*** 
NIRP-effect -0.0903** -0.0632***  -0.0301 0.0851***  
 (0.0372) (0.0247)  (0.0205) (0.0193)  
R2 0.1643 0.0247  0.2788 0.1632  
N.Banks 4559 4640  3361 3443  
N.Obs 15096 15259   10877 11142   
Panel D.       
Fixed rate countries    Floating rate countries  26.20%*** 
NIRP-effect 0.0222 0.0286*  -0.0368** 0.0031  
 (0.0155) (0.0141)  (0.0141) (0.0107)  
R2 0.0058 0.0017  0.0244 0.0008  
N.Banks 3689 3773  6436 6543  
N.Obs 13095 13411   23066 23454   
Panel E.        
Less Capitalised    More Capitalised  6.40%*** 
NIRP-Effect -0.0267 -0.0102  -0.1502*** -0.0937*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0151)  (0.0191) (0.0154) 
R2 0.43 0.348  0.272 0.191 
N.Banks 2726 2726  6036 6153 
N.Obs 7428 7428   18545 18973 
Note: Panel A displays difference-in-differences regression results obtained by splitting the sample according to 
the median level of Off-balance sheet items on total assets. Weak-hedging is defined as those banks with less than 
6% off-balance sheet assets to total assets ratio, and vice versa for Strong-hedging banks. Panel B presents 
difference-in-differences regression results for a sample of significantly supervised entities (SIs) belonging to the 
treatment group. The control group used has been created by applying nearest neighbour propensity score 
matching. Panel C displays difference-in-differences regression results obtained by splitting the sample between 
more competitive and less competitive banking sectors as measured by the Lerner index. More competitive 
systems are those banking sectors with a Lerner index below 0.24, and vice versa for less competitive markets. 
Panel D shows difference-in-differences results obtained by splitting the sample dividing the treatment group into 
floating and fixed rate countries. Fixed rate are those countries having a share of variable loans to total loans lower 
than 63% and vice versa for fixed-rate loans. Panel E presents difference-in-differences regression results obtained 
by splitting the sample between less and well capitalised banks. Banks are considered as less capitalised if they 
have Tier 1 ratio below the median value (14.37%) and vice versa for well capitalised banks. NIM is the yearly 
difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total interest earning assets. 
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ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. NIRP-effect is the interaction between the dummy Treated and 
the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP implementation, 
0 otherwise. Weak-hedging is the below median off-balance sheet to total assets ratio. Strong-hedging is the above 
median off-balance sheet to total assets ratio. Lending diversification is the ratio of loans inside the Europe on 
total loans. More competitive is the below median of the Lerner index. Less competitive is the above median level 
of Lerner index. Floating rate countries is the above median share of variable rate loans in total loans to households 
and non-financial corporations. Fixed rate countries is the below median share of variable rate loans in total loans 
to households and non-financial corporations. Less capitalised is the below median of tier1 ratio. More capitalised 
is the above median of tier1 ratio. T-test for difference in means among the median level of the variables is also 
reported. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9. NIRP and bank specialisation.  
                         
  
Bank Holdings 
Companies Commercial Banks Cooperative Banks Finance Companies 
Real Estate and  
Mortgage Banks Savings Banks 
 NIM(1) ROA(2) NIM(3) ROA(4) NIM(5) ROA(6) NIM(7) ROA(8) NIM(9) ROA(10) NIM(11) ROA(12) 
Panel A.             
NIRP-effect -0.0876  -0.1329***  -0.0793***  -0.2630***  -0.3012***  -0.0986***  
 (0.0680)  (0.0321  (0.0229)  (0.0742)  (0.0635)  (0.0282)  
Panel B.             
NIRP-effect  0.0232  -0.0504**  -0.0122  -0.1841***  -0.1274***  -0.0078 
  (0.0466)  (0.0247)  (0.0296)  (0.0568)  (0.0494)  (0.0256) 
             
R2 0.3921 0.1545 0.387 0.1741 0.3302 0.2517 0.2939 0.2302 0.3541 0.2491 0.6477 0.5123 
N.Banks 527 531 1425 1446 1663 1664 581 603 226 226 1299 1299 
N.Obs 1960 1980 5222 5287 6157 6162 1949 2026 857 859 4940 4940 
Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total interest earning assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total 
assets ratio. NIRP-effect is the interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP 
implementation, 0 otherwise. Classification for bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, finance companies, real estate and mortgage banks and saving 









Table 10. Robustness checks  
Panel A. Lending rate, deposit rate, interest income and interest expense 
 NIM(1) ROA(2) Interest Income(3) 
Interest 
Expense(4) 
NIRP-effect -0.1193*** -0.008 -0.0026*** -0.0016*** 
 (0.6900) (0.0126) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Loans rate 7.0750*** 3.0984***   
 (0.8746) (0.3707)   
Deposits rate -7.3207*** -2.8912***   
 (0.9049) (0.5787)   
R2 0.4084 0.2929 0.3328 0.4203 
N.Banks 5092 5098 5888 5776 
N.Obs 15209 15223 17396 17091 
Panel B. Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP) 
 NIM(1) ROA(2) NIM(3) ROA(4) 
NIRP-effect -0.1520*** -0.0584*** -0.1620*** -0.0842*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0105) 
CB_GR -0.0393* 0.0733***   
 -0.0209 -0.0196   
M0_GR   -0.0012*** 0.0005* 
   -0.0003 -0.0003 
R2 0.295 0.2124 0.2791 0.2004 
N.Banks 7238 7354 5335 5422 
N.Obs 25212 25627 19486 19809 
Panel C. NIRP and the EU Panel D. NIRP, no Switzerland, Norway and Sweden  
 NIM(1) ROA(2) NIM(3) ROA(4) 
NIRP-effect -0.1601*** -0.0584*** -0.1284*** -0.0589*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0198) (0.0154) (0.0124) 
     
R2 0.2189 0.128 0.261 0.212 
N.Banks 5527 5623 6543 6658 
N.Obs 19897 20244 23363 23784 
Panel E. Fake NIRP Panel F. NIRP at aggregate level 
  NIM(1)  ROA(2) NIM(3) ROA(4) 
NIRP-effect -0.017 -0.0079 -0.0014 0.0033 
 (0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0064) (0.0153) 
     
R2 0.124 0.0789 0.735 0.273 
N.Banks/Countries 7183 7307 33 33 
N.Obs 20123 20472 132 132 
Note: Panel A (Columns 1 and 2) displays difference-in-differences regression results when both Loans rate and 
Deposits rate have been controlled for, while Columns 3 and 4 present results where the dependent variables are 
interest income (Column 3) and interest expenses (Column 4). Panel B shows the difference-in-differences 
regression results when proxies of unconventional monetary policies are included. Panel C reports difference-in-
differences regression results when the treatment group includes only European NIRP adopters and the control 
group includes only European non-NIRP adopters. Panel D displays difference-in-differences regression results 
when late NIRP adopter countries (Switzerland, Norway and Sweden) have been removed from the sample. Panel 
E shows difference-in-differences regression results where the NIRP intervention has been set in 2013. Panel F 
displays difference-in-differences regressions results of the NIRP effect at the aggregate country level. NIM is the 
yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total interest earning 
assets. ROA is the yearly net income to total assets ratio. NIRP-effect is the interaction between the dummy 
Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP after NIRP 
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implementation, 0 otherwise. Interest income is the ratio of interest income to total assets. Interest expenses is the 
ratio of interest expenses on total assets. Loans rate is the ratio of interest on loans to total gross loans. Deposits 
rate is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. . M0_GR is the logarithmic yearly growth rate of the money 






Table A1 Correlation Matrix. This table represents the correlation matrix among the variables used in the baseline regression. Correlations that 
are significant at least at 5% level are reported using bold italics. The number on the horizontal axis indicates the variables in the vertical axis. 
Each horizontal number matches with the variable’s position in the vertical. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Size 
 
-0.27 0.07 0.01 -0.26 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.15 0.22 -0.00 0.12 0.09 
E/TA -0.27 
 
0.11 0.11 -0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.23 0.06 0.09 -0.2 0.12 -0.07 0.21 
Liquidity 0.07 0.11 
 
-0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
Credit risk 0.01 0.11 -0.06 
 
-0.27 -0.06 -0.14 0.15 -0.12 -0.25 -0.04 0.33 -0.32 0.00 
Cost-to-income -0.26 -0.08 0.06 -0.27 
 
-0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.12 -0.13 -0.37 0.02 
Loan growth 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 
 
0.07 0.15 0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.08 0.05 
GDP growth 0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.07 
 
-0.07 0.18 0.31 0.10 -0.16 0.05 0.15 
Inflation -0.03 0.23 0.03 0.15 -0.05 0.15 -0.07 
 
-0.26 -0.06 -0.16 0.37 -0.02 0.09 
Depth credit 
info 
0.00 0.06 0.13 -0.12 0.10 0.07 0.18 -0.26 
 
0.52 0.36 -0.08 0.07 0.03 
Legal rights 0.15 0.09 0.07 -0.25 -0.02 0.09 0.31 -0.06 0.52 
 
0.73 -0.05 0.16 0.19 
Credit-to-GDP 0.22 -0.20 0.06 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07 0.10 -0.16 0.36 0.73 
 
-0.07 0.04 0.04 
Yield curve -0.00 0.12 0.00 0.33 -0.13 0.01 -0.16 0.37 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 
 
-0.10 0.00 
Taxation 0.12 -0.07 0.02 -0.32 -0.37 0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.10 
 
-0.09 
Reserve 0.09 0.21 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.00 -0.09 
 
Note: Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. E/TA is the ratio of bank equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid securities to total assets. Credit risk 
is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets. Cost-to-income is the ratio of operating expenses to operating income. Loan growth is the logarithm growth rate of gross loans. 
GDP growth is the yearly growth rate of real GDP. Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index in percentage. Depth credit info is the depth of credit information index. Legal 
rights is the legal rights index. Credit-to-GDP is the ratio of aggregate gross loans to real GDP. Yield curve is the 10-year government bond return. Taxation is the ratio of taxes 
on operating income. Reserve is the ratio of cash and balances at the central bank on total assets. 
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Table A2. This table shows macroeconomic indicators and Pearson correlation test for the 
control and treatment group during the period 2007-2015. We arbitrarily chose a longer time 
period (in comparison with the sample period) to highlight that these macroeconomic indicators 
move together for several years after the GFC. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
           
Variable Mean Control Mean Treatment Std.Dev. Control Std.Dev. Treatment Pearson Corr. 
      
Unemployment 7.38 7.54 1.86 3.70 0.6978* 
     
 
GDP growth 0.35 0.19 0.47 0.64 0.9021*** 
     
 
Inflation 2.04 1.47 1.53 1.22 0.8659*** 
     
 
            
Note: Unemployment is the yearly level of unemployment in percentage. GDP growth is the yearly growth rate 












Table A3. This table displays variables, units, description and source of the variables used in the sample.  
      







Bank Profitability and Margin      
NIM ratio 
Net interest margin computed as the difference between interest earning assets and  
interest bearing liabilities divided by the amount of interest earning assets. Orbis Bank Focus n.a n.a 
ROA ratio Return on assets is calculated by dividing bank's net income by total assets. Orbis Bank Focus n.a n.a 
Dummy      
Treated dummy 
Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank i in 
country j has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise.  - - 
Post dummy 
Post is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after a period that country j  
at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period.  - - 
Treatment dummy Treatment is the interaction between the dummy treated and the dummy post  - - 
Bank balance sheet      
Size logarithm Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Orbis Bank Focus - + 
E/TA ratio E/TA is calculated as the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Orbis Bank Focus + -/+ 
Liquidity ratio Liquidity is computed as the ratio of bank liquid securities on total assets. Orbis Bank Focus + -/+ 
Credit risk ratio Credit risk is computed as the ratio of loan loss provisions on total assets. 
Orbis Bank Focus  
& SNL financial + -/+ 
Cost-to-income ratio Cost-to-income ratio is calculated as the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. 
Orbis Bank Focus  
& SNL financial - - 
Loan growth percentage  Loan growth is the logarithmic growth rate of gross loans. 
Orbis Bank Focus  
& SNL financial + + 
Off-balance sheet ratio Off-balance sheet is computed as the ratio of off-balance sheet on total assets Orbis Bank Focus + + 
Non-interest income ratio Non-interest income is calculated as the ratio of non-interest income on gross revenues Orbis Bank Focus - + 
Fees & commissions ratio Fees & commissions is calculated as the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets Orbis Bank Focus - + 
Interest income ratio Interest income is calculated as the ratio of interest income on total assets Orbis Bank Focus + + 
Interest expenses ratio Interest expenses is calculated as the ratio of interest expenses on total assets Orbis Bank Focus - - 
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Macroeconomic Conditions  
and Monetary Policy      
GDP growth percentage  GDP growth is calculated the yearly growth rate of real GDP. Thompson Datastream  -/+ -/+ 
Inflation percentage  Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index. Thompson Datastream  + + 
Unemployment percentage  Unemployment is the yearly level of unemployment.  World Bank Database - - 
Yield curve percentage points Yield curve is measured as the 10-year government bond return. Thompson Datastream  + + 
Credit-to-GDP ratio Credit-to-GDP is measured as the ratio of gross loans to real GDP. 
Bank for International  
Settlement Database + + 
CB_GR percentage CB_GR is the logarithm growth rate of central bank balance sheet size. Orbis Bank Focus  - + 
M0_GR percentage M0_GR is the logarithm growth rate of of the money supply M0. Thompson Datastream  - + 
Loans rate ratio Loans rate is the ratio of interest on loans to total gross loans.  Orbis Bank Focus  + + 
Deposits rate ratio Deposits rate is the ratio of interest expenses to total cost of deposits. Orbis Bank Focus - - 
Lerner index positive number 
The Lerner index is the difference between the price and the total marginal cost as a 
proportion of the price of banking services.  
It ranges between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly). 
World Bank Global 
Financial  
Development 
Database - - 
Floating-fixed rate countries ratio 
Floating-fixed rate countries is computed as the share of variable rate loans in  




Database - - 
Institutional Variables      
Depth of credit info positive number  
Depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and high 
quality of credit information available through public or private  
credit register. The index ranges from 0 to 8 with higher value indicating the availability of 
more credit information.  
World Bank Doing  
Business Database - - 
Legal right positive number  
Legal right is an index that measures the strengths of minority shareholder protections 
against misuse of corporate assets by directors for their personal gain as well  
as shareholders rights, governance safeguards and corporate transparency requirements that 
reduce the risk of abuse. It ranges from 0 (weak legal rights protection) to 12 (strong legal 
rights protection). 
World Bank Doing  
Business Database + + 
Reserve  ratio Reserve is calculated as the ratio of cash and balances at the central bank on total assets. 
Orbis Bank Focus   
& SNL financial -/+ -/+ 
Taxation ratio Taxation is computed as the ratio of taxes on operating income 
Orbis Bank Focus   
& SNL financial -/+ -/+ 
 
